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ABSTRACT
After HTTPS: Indicating Risk Instead of Security
Matthew W. Holt
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
Browser security indicators show warnings when sites load without HTTPS, but
more malicious sites are using HTTPS to appear legitimate in browsers and deceive users.
We explore a new approach to browser indicators that overcomes several limitations of
existing indicators. First, we develop a high-level risk assessment framework to identify risky
interactions and evaluate the utility of this approach through a survey. Next, we evaluate
potential designs for a new risk indicator to communicate risk rather than security. Finally,
we conduct a within-subjects user study to compare the risk indicator to existing security
indicators by observing participant behavior and collecting feedback. Our results suggest that
risk indicators make users more confident in judging their risk and that participants prefer
risk indicators over current security indicators. In addition, users take fewer risks in the
presence of risk indicators, making this a promising direction for research and implementation
into web browsers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The Web is changing. Until 2014, less than 25% of pages were reportedly loaded over
encrypted HTTPS connections.1 As of January 2019, however, Google reports that 80-91% of
page loads in Chrome use HTTPS.2 This can be explained largely due to several coordinated
shifts in the ecosystem: (1) the practical cost to site owners for TLS certificates has dropped
to zero, (2) the validation and renewal procedures can be entirely automated through a
newly-standardized protocol called ACME [3], (3) updated laws and policies mandate the use
of HTTPS,3 and (4) public support in the form of cross-signed roots, donations, sponsorships,
and widespread technical integrations have made Let’s Encrypt the largest (most-issuing)
CA in the world in a matter of months.4
Although this progress is impressive, it comes with trade-offs. Historically, malicious
sites would not use HTTPS due to its prohibitive cost and the tedious validation required to
deploy it, and browsers started indicating secure connections by showing a lock icon next
to the page URL to assure visitors that their connection was encrypted. Even though the
absence of a lock icon does not stop users from taking risky actions [42], the presence of
the padlock became the standard way to determine whether it was safe to enter your secret
credentials, credit card details, or other sensitive data.
1

Percentage of Web Pages Loaded by Firefox Using HTTPS, Let’s Encrypt, https://letsencrypt.org/
stats/#percent-pageloads
2
Google Transparency Report, https://transparencyreport.google.com/https/overview
3
White House Office of Management and Budget memorandum M-15-13: “A Policy to Require Secure
Connections across Federal Websites and Web Services”, https://https.cio.gov/
4
Merkle Town, Cloudflare, https://ct.cloudflare.com

1

Figure 1.1: Current security indicators make malicious sites even more deceptive. (This
domain was obtained from certificate transparency logs in 2018.)
However, researchers reported that phishing sites in 2016 used HTTPS nearly 3%
of the time, and the rate is increasing quickly [30]; by 2017, 25% of the time; and in 2018,
nearly 50% of phishing sites used HTTPS [50]. Other studies have shown that users wrongly
interpret the padlock icon to mean that the site itself is secure, not that the ephemeral
connection to the (possibly malicious) site is secure [39]. This growing use of HTTPS makes
scams more effective, and it’s one of the reasons why Chrome has begun the process of hiding
the padlock icon in favor of negative indicators only: warning when a site does not use proper
HTTPS, and showing no positive indicator when they do [41]. That avoids giving malicious
sites extra legitimacy, but in a world full of HTTPS, there is little current browser indicators
can do to be useful.
Clearly, new browser indicators are needed. Because indicators in their current form
still provide helpful warnings about insecure connections and blacklisted sites, we do not
suggest removing them or making drastic changes. Instead, we can repurpose them. But doing
so requires looking at more than just the security properties of a connection. Fortunately, web
browsers—acting as user agents—have access to a plethora of technical information crossing
several layers as they look up, download, and render web pages. This information could be
used to expand the capabilities of indicators to detect risky interactions on deceptive HTTPS
pages.
This paper explores a new approach to browser indicators for an all-HTTPS world.
It shifts the browser indicator paradigm from security and privacy to risk and deception.
2

Figure 1.2: Our approach uses a risk indicator that warns users of deceptive sites, with
descriptive warnings explaining why the site may be deceptive.
Instead of toggling its appearance based on connection security, our indicator is designed to
appear with interactions the browser deems risky. Although “risk” can be ambiguous and
“risky interaction” is subjective, we refer to interactions that are more likely to expose the user,
their information, or their device to abuse based on the technical characteristics of the site,
context of the current interaction, and user’s browser history. We use a privacy-preserving
approach that makes purely local decisions and does not reveal a user’s browsing history to
third parties.
For example, suppose a user clicks a hyperlink to a page that redirects to four different
sites before settling on a site they have never been to, where they enter information into
a form. This interaction of data entry could be considered risky because similar patterns
are common with phishing sites: the link might be malicious, redirects could be used for
tracking and misdirection, and there is no good reason to trust a new site with a user’s
sensitive information. In today’s browsers, this site would still appear legitimate, as shown in
Figure 1.1, because it uses HTTPS and is not on a blacklist. Our approach has the browser
indicate the risk to the user, as shown in Figure 1.2.

3

We view this work as complementary with ongoing efforts to protect users from a
variety of threats they encounter when browsing the Web, such as phishing and malware.
These attacks are difficult to prevent because they take advantage of the same characteristics as
legitimate sites (similar domain names, valid certificates) and rely on user habits (e.g. trusting
links) to succeed. While browsers and third-party security software attempt to block attacks,
the most common solution in use today requires curating an extensive blacklist through
reports of threats from both users and experts (sometimes aided by machine learning [52]).
Because blacklist entries can only exist after a threat is identified, there is a delay between
when a threat appears and when the blacklist starts protecting users. Our work has the
potential to catch sites before they appear in a blacklist, while also protecting from a broader
array of threats than just phishing and malware attacks.
Our contribution has three main parts. First, we describe a high-level risk assessment
framework that is designed to expose not only phishing, but deception attacks in general, by
adding contextual information that current security indicators do not consider, to determine
if the current interaction is risky. We develop a new set of browser warnings based on this
framework and survey users on the helpfulness of these warnings. Second, we design a risk
indicator to communicate potential risks to users as a possible replacement for current security
indicators. Finally, we conduct a user study which evaluates the effectiveness and perceived
helpfulness of risk indicators and compares them to the existing security indicator.
Our results suggest that warnings issued by our framework are helpful overall; that
users feel more confident about judging their risk after investigating the warnings than with
current security indicators; and that users like having the second opinion or being made
aware when something “seems off.” Results from one of our surveys helped us choose a risk
indicator design which has a positive sentiment but still conveys a mild sense of alarm. We
also have some evidence that, given optional tasks, the presence of risk indicators can be
correlated to fewer risky interactions.

4

Artifacts: We have created a companion website at https://indicators.internet.
byu.edu that provides the source code, study materials, and data.

5

Chapter 2
Related Work

There is an extensive amount of prior research about browser warnings and security
indicators, and we incorporate some of the recommendations for improving them into our
own work. However, the object of our research is distinct from prior work which examines
how noticeable browser indicators are [8] or how to improve warning adherence rates [38].
In our studies, we informed each participant to look for indicators, mostly eliminating the
variable of whether the indicator is noticed; and the goals of our warnings are different from
traditional/current warnings which encourage users to leave the site.
Similarly, there is a broad range of existing work to detect phishing. Although our
work is not focused on detecting phishing, we do find several of these techniques useful in
our goal, which is assessing risk. Interactions are risky if they may be subject to deception,
and we view deception as when the user may not be aware of an interaction or when an
interaction may not result in what the user intends. The browser, acting as a user agent, has
unique technical insights that can expose deception.
Of the many works that are specifically about detecting deceptive sites or grading a
site’s credibility, they specifically focus on fact-checking the content of a page or filtering
fake reviews [13, 15, 32]. By contrast, we do not analyze the content of the page because we
view deception generally, without constraining the scope of threats to just fake reviews, false
claims, or phishing. Our work is largely agnostic of any specific threat.

6

2.1

Browser Indicators and Warnings

Browser indicator refers to an optional icon next to the URL which is controlled by the
browser to indicate a state of security or insecurity with regards to the current connection
and sometimes blacklist status. Clicking indicators yields more information and site- or
connection-specific settings.
Browser warnings typically appear in the content area of the browser or spawn from
an icon in the URL bar, depending on the context. Both of these are currently used in
mainstream browsers to warn the user of threats or give them confidence in their activities.
Browser warnings have changed throughout the years. In 2013, Akhawe and Felt
studied browser warnings at a massive scale using Chrome and Firefox telemetry and found
that users get fatigued and ignore frequent warnings, that difficulty in bypassing warnings is
not necessarily a deterrent to do so, and that most users who bypass warnings click through
after a shorter time than those who heed the warning and leave [2]. As a result, warnings
have generally become louder, less wordy, and more accurate. This is called “opinionated
design” which was recommended in 2015 by the Chrome team [10] and again in 2019 by the
Firefox team [51].
Since then, newer research confirmed that these improved browser warnings actually
can be effective and that users are not oblivious to warnings’ utility [38]. They also present
evidence that habituation, or bypassing warnings due to fatigue, is not a significant factor in
modern browser warnings: users do not consistently click through warnings anymore.
For the time being [41], browsers also show positive reinforcement in the presence of
secure connections. Google Chrome and Firefox have a security indicator visible to users
when the page is transmitted encrypted with TLS by showing a lock icon. Until recently, the
word “Secure” was visible next to the URL on HTTPS pages [11] but was removed to reduce
miscommunications [41].
While it is good that the page was loaded securely, the lock icon does not indicate
that the web page or site is secure. This is contrary to what many users believe, who see
7

(a) Google Chrome’s security indicator with
on-click popup explaining the lock icon.

(b) Mozilla Firefox’s security indicator has
less verbiage on click but re-states the hostname.

Figure 2.1: Security indicators in two of the major browsers as of February 2019.

Figure 2.2: Chrome’s plans for secure indicators as of Q1 2018 [41].
the lock icon and think this means the site itself is secure [39]. In fact, malicious sites can
now easily and automatically obtain domain-validated TLS certificates to procure positive
reinforcement in browsers; this is one of the most substantial reasons new research and new
methods are needed. It is mainly for this reason that Chrome, and perhaps eventually other
major browsers, are slowly phasing out the security indicator and will only show warnings
when something is amiss with the connection [11], as shown in Figure 2.2.
Clicking the icon in Chrome yields more information that explains that the connection
is secure, but it also implies that the site will keep the user’s sensitive information private,
with no real technical or even intuitive reason to substantiate that claim (see Figure 2.1a).
Mozilla Firefox shows a similar lock icon, with less verbiage on click, as in Figure 2.1b.
As for deception and malware, Both Chrome and Firefox rely on Google Safe Browsing1
to warn users of malware or deceptive sites. Safe Browsing is essentially a blacklist which
1

Security/Safe Browsing, Mozilla, https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Safe Browsing
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(a) Google Chrome

(b) Mozilla Firefox [51]

Figure 2.3: Examples of interstitial warnings in mainstream web browsers as of March 2019.
is maintained by Google for the purpose of hiding sites from search results and showing
warnings if a site is known to be malicious. The warnings in Chrome and Firefox are quite
loud, filling the entire page (Figure 2.3).
Microsoft SmartScreen2 works similarly on Windows with the Edge browser. It shows
a warning if a site is on a blacklist or if a site exhibits suspicious behavior, although what that
comprises is not publicized. Screening downloads is more nuanced: if a file is on a blacklist,
the user is shown an error, and if the file is not on a whitelist, the user is shown a warning.
Safe Browsing and SmartScreen become effective fairly soon after a new threat emerges,
but not instantaneously, and their proprietary natures make it tricky for other browsers to
adopt. Further, reporting malicious sites can be risky. Malicious sites can be reported by
users, but this often requires visiting the malicious site and using an in-browser feature.3
Reporting can be more safely done out-of-band,4 but doing so loses critical context,5 making
reports less comprehensive.
2

Windows Defender SmartScreen, https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threatprotection/windows-defender-smartscreen/windows-defender-smartscreen-overview (Microsoft)
3
How to report a phishing Web site, https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/930167/how-toreport-a-phishing-web-site (Microsoft)
4
Send a Report to Google, https://safebrowsing.google.com/safebrowsing/report general/
(Google); Report unsafe site, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/support/report-unsafe-site
(Microsoft)
5
For example, deceptive redirect chains.
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Figure 2.4: An example of Chrome’s predictive phishing warning [4].

Figure 2.5: Mozilla Firefox’s redesigned warnings use color scaled to risk level [51].
Google Chrome has one extra warning type that is tied to a phishing-specific countermeasure called predictive phishing protection [4]. The details of how it works are not
published, but its approach is similar to ours in that it detects emerging phishing threats and
shows a warning in a pop-out similar to what we design, which originates outside the content
area of the page (Figure 2.4). However, as far as is published, this feature only applies to
Google sites and activates only after entering your credentials [4].
Firefox recently redesigned their warnings to more effectively communicate potential
risks, which is more like our own approach. Some Firefox warnings outline interstitial warnings
in a solid color appropriate to the level of risk, and the security indicator is replaced with an
alert icon and text that says “Security Risk” (Figure 2.5) [51].
In general, warnings about phishing, TLS errors, or malicious sites and downloads are
a tricky problem. Most browsers (and related work which recommends new warnings [27])
10

show full-page interstitials, but malicious sites can impersonate these kinds of warnings
because they appear inside the content area of the window. In those cases, the “Back to
safety” button (or equivalent) can actually return a user to a phishing page where they think
they are protected.

2.2

Phishing & Deceptive Sites

We consider phishing detection to be related work mainly because phishing sites share many
attributes common to other kinds of deceptive sites; and although not all risky interactions
are only on deceptive sites, interactions on sites which are trying to be deceptive inherently
pose greater risk. Thus, our paper builds on published phishing work, but not with the goal
of classifying phishing sites with high accuracy. Instead, we are interested in features that
are common among deceptive sites; or, in other words, we are interested in the inputs used
to classify phishing more than the output of classifiers.
Numerous methods for combating phishing have been proposed previously, all of which
fall into two main camps: prevention and detection [21]. Precise definitions of the two vary,
but in general, prevention’s goal is to prevent the user from ever reaching a phishing site,
while detection’s goal is to detect when the user has reached a phishing site and to warn them
accordingly. Much prevention work covers detecting phishing emails [12], but we note that
these days there are many other effective ways to spread malicious links globally, especially by
using social media [49]. Because of the many venues with which deceptive links can spread,
our work is strictly detection-focused, where the user has presumably already accessed a
malicious link and is now loading it in a web browser. Since the boundary of prevention and
detection is fuzzy and often overlap, here we examine related works from both angles.

Whitelists. A whitelist is a list of approved sites that have been cleared for access. At a
global scale, whitelists can become unwieldy, but Han et al. suggest a personalized whitelist
that correlates a user’s input historically to each site and warns if certain features have

11

changed, such as the IP address for the domain or the web site’s TLS certificate [5]. This
technique does not handle legitimate DNS updates, HTML changes, or certificate renewals
particularly gracefully.

Blacklists. A blacklist is a list of flagged sites that have been reported as unsafe or deceptive.
Blacklists do not protect against emerging threats because new sites have to be seen and
reported before they can be added to the list. Despite this limitation, blacklists are very
effective in practice and are used by ad blockers and almost all major browsers. Blacklists
are usually considered universal; i.e. a site that is malicious to one user is to any other also
[35]. Blacklists are usually manually curated, imposing a huge maintenance burden, but
Whittaker et al. demonstrate a machine learning approach used by Google to automatically
maintain a phishing blacklist for web browsers [52]. Prakash et al. present PhishNet as a
method for growing blacklists which uses enumeration of known phishing URLs to discover
new ones; those URLs are then spliced into tokens for matching against a word blacklist,
but then external resources are needed to score the legitimacy of candidates [34]. Once
curated, a blacklist is then either distributed to clients (requiring regular updates) or hosted
centrally (requiring network queries to check if items of interest are in the list). The former
has scalability problems and the latter can have negative privacy implications.

Heuristics. Another few methods examine the behavior of a web page as it relates to user
input [21]. For example, Joshi et al. propose a system which submits wrong data and inspects
the response before submitting the real information [20]. Shahriar and Zulkernine propose a
similar system that monitors website behavior in the presence of random inputs [43]. These
techniques are useful, as they require phishing sites to imitate not only appearance but also
behavior of the genuine site; and they are effective when phishing sites are not true to the
actual site’s behavior. However, they are likely to fail if the phishing site verifies the user’s
input by submitting it to the genuine site in the background and proxying back the response,
which is now easily automated [7], even bypassing some two-factor authentication. Phishing
12

sites may also be incentivized to always fail login attempts to derive alternative credentials
from a user, thus conducting an enumeration attack.

Machine learning (ML). Several feature-based defenses against phishing have been
developed, including the use of machine learning systems—especially support vector machines,
neural networks, and other gradient-descent methods [6, 21, 23].6 The vast spread of ML
work uses hundreds of features ranging from measuring the spelling accuracy on a page,
HTML formatting, and URL contents to domain name WHOIS information, form properties,
and site popularity [40]. Not all features are globally the same; Fette et al. suggest using
number of previous visits in browser history as a feature [12]. A technique by Varshney et
al. indirectly leverages machine learning and popularity metrics by obtaining results from
a trusted search engine to determine if the page can be trusted [47]. Malicious pages that
use evasion techniques such as images and executable scripts can fool text-based feature
classifiers, and legitimate pages that make heavy use of images or scripts to fill the page can
be misclassified as fraudulent in an over-correction for false negatives. Many machine learning
classifiers cannot easily explain why a certain classification was given; a whole field of machine
learning has spun off to tackle this problem, known as “interpretable deep learning.”7 In
addition, assumptions made about some features used by classifiers are now being shown
to be incorrect, rendering the system less reliable; for example, phishing domains are not
necessarily short-lived [22]. The difficulty of retraining learned models to adapt to changing
threats is acknowledged by many of these works.

Hostname analysis. A high-level deception technique known as squatting refers to taking
advantage of users who make mistakes typing or reading website addresses. Variants include
typosquatting, soundsquatting, and combosquatting. When typosquatting, attackers use
6

It is worth noting that feature- and heuristic-based approaches are distinct because features alone do
not make classifications/predictions. A feature is something like “the number of characters in the URL.”
Heuristics (or rules) augment features with clearly-defined logic, whereas ML models synthesize features in a
way that is often difficult to explain.
7
Interpretable ML Symposium, http://interpretable.ml/
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domains that result from common typos of popular names [46]. Similarly, soundsquatting
is using domains that sound similar to popular names, but are spelled differently [31].
Combosquatting involves domains that combine a trademark with some other word to look
legitimate [22]. Szurdi et al. developed a tool which, depending on the configured mode, uses
purely static or lexical features, domain WHOIS and DNS information, and possibly other
information obtained by crawling, to detect squatting [46].

Password managers. Password managers can be an effective mechanism to prevent
phishing and work similarly to a whitelist: first-time logins are stored with the password
manager along with some or all of the URL. As long as the password manager is used
consistently for data entry instead of entering it manually, the password manager should not
auto-fill information into a site with a URL it does not recognize, thus preventing accidental
data entry into fraudulent sites [14]. They generally rely solely on DNS when deciding to
allow automatic data entry on a page, so they handle changes to underlying DNS records
better than an explicit name-to-IP mapping. However, users might get frustrated when a
password manager refuses to auto-fill form information in the event of a phish and force the
password manager to fill the credentials manually. The role of password managers is to make
data entry on legitimate pages easier, not to block data entry on deceptive sites.

2.3

Comparison to Related Work

The primary novelty which distinguishes our work is how we frame the browser’s role in
protecting users from threats. The traditional approach taken by the related work frames
it as, “If browsers identify a threat, they block it.” We frame it differently as, “If
browsers suspect there is a risk, they explain why.”
We have covered related work which addresses both the premise (identifying threats)
and the conclusion (blocking/explaining threats, i.e. security UI). In our search, we only
found one recent paper which connects both together [27], and its results are promising.
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However, even though that paper’s proposed warnings were preferred over current browser
warnings, its warnings are still predicated on positively-identified threats rather than risk
assessment. This is a fundamental limitation of the paradigm shared by all related works
we found: it assumes users are willing to trust a blind determination, which we know is not
correct [26, 38].
To overcome this limitation, we think a different approach is needed to help users
avoid deception. The motivation for our approach is rooted in the belief that even if detection
systems are 100% accurate, deception attacks will still succeed because detection alone is not
enough to stop attacks. Because current browsers frame the problem as detecting threats
and classifying sites as dangerous or benign, warnings derived in this way can only be so
helpful, and data has shown that people click through such warnings [2, 10, 26, 54]. One
reason users do so is because they have already decided that they trust the site [38] (and our
results reinforce this conclusion). If it is true that users like making their own trust decisions,
we believe that explaining reasons why they may be at elevated risk could be more effective
than only detecting definite threats.
Users are more likely to avoid threats if they decide they are at risk instead of the
browser deciding for them, which is why recent work recommends designing warnings that
explain why the user may be at risk [26, 38, 51, 54]. One major limitation of the existing
work on threat detection is the widespread use of opaque ML models. For the same reasons a
doctor can’t use such systems to diagnose cancer [25], we cannot use them to trigger warnings
telling the user that they are under attack.
There is much to be learned from these approaches, though. We hypothesize that
by informing users about possible risky interactions, users will be more confident making
their own trust decisions. We will apply many similar input features and rules found in prior
work toward our own approach, but instead of combining them using an uninterpretable ML
system, we’ll expose the outcome of individual rules to the user. This allows for specific,
educational warnings that justify why the user may be at risk, which Yang et al. commend in
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their work: “We suggest that integrating training in the warning interface ... and explaining
why warnings are generated will improve current phishing defense” [54]. It also complements
prior work by handling cases when phishing detection fails in at least three scenarios: 1)
the threat is broader than phishing, 2) the threat is still emerging, or 3) the user clicked
through the warning. In all of these cases, our method can still inform the user of the risk
they may be taking. By giving the user new information, their judgment can be augmented
with the coverage already provided by the techniques of prior work, resulting in another layer
of protection against deception.
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Chapter 3
Risk Assessment Framework

The first part of our approach is the risk assessment framework, which is used to
control the display of risk indicators and the text of warnings. Its function is similar to the
current rules which guide today’s security indicators and browser warnings, but we formalize
the assimilation of new rules and unify the various roles of warnings and security indicators
to make it easier for browsers to adapt as the threats of the Web continue to evolve.
Not only do we wish to preserve the benefits of current security indicators and warnings
which enforce strong HTTPS and block known phishing and malware, we aim to expose
deceptive sites in general even before they are blacklisted, specifically to inform the user when
their interactions are at an elevated level of risk. Our framework does this by consulting a
set of rules as functions which consider the user’s individual context and return whether the
interaction may be extra risky.
Our reasoning is backed by Reeder et al.’s conclusion from last year, “Warnings have
improved to the point that additional gains in adherence rates are likely only to be made
by examining contextual factors and a wider variety of users’ concerns, rather than through
one-size-fits-all improvements” [38]. Thus, rather than attempting to classify websites, this
framework classifies interactions. Instead of a globally-applicable decision, risk assessments
are personalized to an individual in their local context.
Unlike most of today’s indicators and warnings, our framework lends itself to unopinionated warning design. This is intentional; we are working in a space where the threats
are both broad and uncertain. What the framework must accomplish is to explain why it
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believes the interaction may be risky and to give the user enough information to make their
own decision. Only the user knows what they are trying to accomplish and therefore whether
the risk is worth it. The framework helps answer the question, “Based on what we know at
the time, is the current interaction more risky, and why?” This is an important aspect of our
framework: it determines when a specific interaction is risky given the current context, as
opposed to when a website has been confirmed as a risk for everyone. This allows us to reveal
a wide variety of threats without having to rely on them being known and reported first.
This approach has several benefits. Its privacy-preserving design doesn’t require calling
out to external resources or third-party services. Unlike blacklists, its defenses are immediately
effective against new threats. And because it operates locally, it is always available, even
if network connections are blocked. Its reliance on the user’s browsing history makes it
robust against many tricks scammers would use to manipulate centralized authorities.1 In
addition to categories of risk that current browsers already protect against such as insecure
connections, malware, and popups, the risk framework supports categories such as resource
abuse, monetary theft, homoglyph and typosquatting attacks, history stuffing, and more.
The actual implementation is flexible, so developers can make adjustments based on
requirements or experimentation. For example, a web browser vendor may want to protect
its users from pages with deceptive billing practices.2 Other protections that are found to be
helpful (such as blacklists) can be added as well.

3.1

Framework

The risk assessment framework evaluates a set of rules (decided by the implementer) to
determine if an interaction is risky.
An implementation of this framework is a function that takes as inputs at least three
parameters: (1) the context of the user’s current visit, (2) the browsing history, and (3)
1

This decentralization is important. Centralized enforcement potentially sets a dangerous precedent for
censorship, especially as we venture into blocking threats that are not as clearly defined.
2
Google Chrome started doing this recently. See “Notifying users of unclear subscription pages”, https:
//blog.chromium.org/2018/11/notifying-users-of-unclear-subscription.html
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the interaction. These inputs are necessary to support the evaluation of rules, and web
browsers—acting as user agents—have this information readily available.
Context of visit. The context of a visit consists of what the browser knows about
the user’s current visit to the site. This would include URL, page title, time of visit, duration
of visit, interactions up to now, HTTP redirects, HTTP response headers, HTTPS validity,
and how the page was accessed (for example: address typed, address pasted, link clicked
from web page, link clicked from email, opened bookmark, submitted form, etc.).
Browsing history. The browser history includes all sites a user has previously visited,
visit durations, lists of interactions, etc. In some situations, a user’s browsing history is
crucial for determining risk, since it is unlikely that an average user will repeat risky activities
or revisit malicious sites. Presence in the history adds legitimacy to a site and often reduces
the risk of an interaction, but we do not recommend treating this as a hard-and-fast whitelist.
Empty browser histories could be augmented with trusted top-sites lists.
Interaction. For our purposes, interactions are anything performed or allowed
through a user agent. They can be implicit or explicit. Possible interactions include loading,
scrolling, selecting, copying, clicking, typing, entering data, submitting, downloading, and
consuming resources.3 Some will be more useful than others, depending on the implementation.
Compound interactions, which are combinations of one or more interactions over time or
in sequence, may also be defined, for example: reading as a function of time, scrolling, and
selecting. Not all interactions are equal in magnitude and scope; reading a phishing page is
not usually risky, but entering data into a phishing page is. Users initiate some interactions
(loading, scrolling, etc), while websites initiate others (downloading, consuming resources,
etc).
To perform a risk assessment, these inputs are fed into each rule to check for elevated
risk. If any of the rules yields a positive return value, the interaction could be considered risky.
3

Some browsers do show errors when a tab hangs or crashes, but this is different from treating high
memory or CPU utilization as a threat. For example, a malicious webpage that mines cryptocurrency might
not crash the tab, but the user should be warned about this interaction.
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To ensure the most correct and complete picture of the current interaction, risk assessments
should be executed in real-time as the interactions happen (or just before they are allowed to
happen).
The output of the risk function is an assessment, which consists of an overall conclusion
(boolean Risky or Not risky) and explanatory text (string) that justifies the decision. The
text should be able to explain why the interaction is or is not risky. In practice, returning a
list of reasons corresponding to each rule may be helpful in gaining insight into the overall
decision, even if not all of that information is always shown to the user. The indicator should
appear as soon as the risk assessment finishes if there is a positive result, optionally with an
automatic pop-out of the warning text to grab attention or block a risky interaction.

3.2

Criteria for Risk Assessment Rules

Rules define the scope of risky interactions. They do not stop deception attacks, but they
constrict the ways attackers can be deceptive if they want to avoid a “Risky” assessment.
Because this framework is flexible, rules are ultimately up to the implementer. However,
in keeping with the design goals of the risk assessment framework, rules should have these
qualities:
• Local. The rule can be evaluated locally and within the context of the browser, without
needing remote or third-party resources. This is necessary for fast evaluation and to
avoid attacks on the network which could block access to vital resources.
• Privacy-preserving. Evaluation of the rule does not reveal or leak data or metadata
to any third party, and does not facilitate tracking or fingerprinting.
• Robust against manipulation. The rule cannot be easily duped by attackers to be
circumvented without triggering another rule that is designed to detect and flag said
manipulation.
• Independent. The rule should not depend on the output of another rule.
20

• Accurate. The rule expresses an elevated level of risk.
• Explainable. The rule can be reasonably explained in layman’s terms so that it can
produce informative warning texts.
• Simple. The rule is easy to describe and can be evaluated efficiently, without using
excessive power or blocking the thread of execution.
While accuracy is a criteria, it may be difficult to measure for a given rule. Some
rules use browser history and user interactions as an input, thus accuracy can vary per user,
and gathering per-user browsing history and interactions for a study has strongly negative
privacy implications. Thus measures of accuracy are limited to rules (or parts of rules) that
identify deception in site characteristics (e.g. URL), though this is imperfect.

3.3

Examples of Rules

To demonstrate the feasibility of the risk assessment framework, we have curated an example
set of rules which can expose many suspicious technical characteristics that browsers do not
currently warn about. Our goal is not to prove that our rules are the best of all possible rules,
nor that they are a complete set. Rather, this is a first cut at a feasible set of rules which
we use to evaluate the perceived helpfulness of warnings produced by the framework and
thus demonstrate the utility of our framework as a whole. Even though our rules are only
examples, we chose them because they express patterns that are inherent with interactions
that are considerably more risky, or are common among sites that are trying to be deceptive.
We primarily derive our choice of rules from prior work in the Internet measurement
and engineering communities. To shape the formation of these rules, we examined past
research, current browser warning designs, blog posts from security experts, alerting techniques
from Facebook’s prominent certificate transparency (CT) monitor,4 and various patterns
4

https://developers.facebook.com/docs/certificate-transparency/
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used by about 50,000 sites on blacklists spanning 2 months from DNS-BH5 and PhishTank.6
In some cases, we tested rules on a collection of 35 million records from CT logs. After
applying engineering judgment, common sense, and our criteria listed above, we settled on
our example rules.
This is similar to how existing browser warnings were developed. For example, browsers
warn when HTTPS connections use weak security, but what exactly constitutes weak security
is based on the judgment of developers and security experts.7 Note that we did not use
techniques from deep learning systems, which can analyze many features and are often
effective [1, 55], because their models are opaque and their predictions do not usually come
with explanations.
These rules are not listed in any particular order of priority or severity, and the
correctness of the framework is not affected by rule order. For convenience, we’ve grouped
our rules into arbitrary categories, but rules need not be limited to these categories.

Connection-based Rules
Plaintext HTTP This rule triggers when the page is loaded over an unencrypted connection, i.e. it is not using HTTPS. The perils of plaintext HTTP are well-understood and
widely accepted, and this is already a significant part of the logic controlling existing security
indicators.

Invalid, weak, or partial HTTPS When a page or any of its resources are loaded over
an HTTPS connection with broken security properties, or if any resources are loaded over
plain HTTP, this rule triggers, similar to the logic of current security indicators. Users are
warned if any of their connections provide weak confidentiality, authenticity, or integrity
guarantees.
5

http://www.malwaredomains.com/
http://phishtank.com/
7
See cert status flags.cc and ssl error handler.cc in the Chromium source code for an idea of
how complex the mapping from technical attribute to threat is, at https://chromium.googlesource.com/
chromium/src.
6
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History-based rules
Sequential subdomain labels The domain of the page being visited consists of a sequential combination of subdomain labels that comprises the right-most labels of a hostname
in the user’s browsing history [28], including any replacements of the dot characters (label
separator). For example, visiting a host paypal.com.secure-signin.net would trigger this
rule if paypal.com is already in the browsing history. We did work to verify this rule is
helpful. In our site blacklist, 199/655 of the phishing URLs that mentioned “paypal” also used
“paypal.com” or “paypal-com”. Over the course of just one week, alarms from Facebook’s
CT monitor configured for apple.com and google.com reported 469 hostnames suspicious in
this manner being issued new TLS certificates (many of which did not appear on the updated
blacklists, months later). We simply apply logic like what Facebook’s CT monitor uses to
the browser.

Adding or removing hyphens Adding or removing a combination of hyphens to or from
the site’s hostname matches another hostname in the user’s browsing history. This was the
tactic of at least one significant deceptive site in 2018 which spread widely on social media.
Its manipulation of technical properties such as domain name and site design reportedly
caused many readers emotional distress and even altered their belief systems [44, 53].

Typosquatting The hostname of the page being visited resembles a hostname in the
browsing history in a way that could be attributed to a typing error [46]. This rule’s obvious
function is to warn against sites that are taking advantage of natural mistakes which would
be difficult to notice if the typosquatting site is deceptive. Research has shown that there is
a wide variety of domain squatting attacks in the wild [22, 31, 46].

Visited only recently and for short time This rule is preemptive. Anticipating that
deceptive sites may try to manipulate a user’s browser history to gain false legitimacy and
thereby dodge certain rules in this framework, this rule triggers when a site being visited
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appears in the browsing history only recently and has a short cumulative visit duration. We
expect that most legitimate site visits aren’t much shorter than about 2 seconds.

Host-based Rules
Excessive hyphens The domain name contains more hyphens than most website owners
would prefer to have in their name. For similar reasons as with the previous rule, this rule
triggers when hyphens are used by sites trying to make their domain name recognizable but
which are not desirable first choices by site owners. Like some of the other rules, it is difficult
to claim exactly how many sites are using excessive hyphens in an attempt to be deceptive,
but as a point of reference, 4.2% of sites on our phishing and malware blacklist contained 3 or
more hyphens. By comparison, only 1 of the Tranco [24] top 50,000 have 3 or more hyphens,
and of the whole top million, only 3 do.

Many labels in domain name The domain name contains more labels than most userfacing websites normally contain, ignoring eTLD [29]. It is difficult to consult a “ground
truth” data source to know exactly how many sites use excessive labels for deception outside
of phishing and malware, but as a point of reference, 9.2% of sites on the blacklists we used
had 4 or more labels in the domain name (not including eTLD). Only 0.028% (14 sites) of
the Tranco8 [24] top 50,000 had 4 or more labels in the domain name.

Long domain name The domain name is longer than that of most common, user-facing
websites. Normally, domain names are desired because they are easier to type, remember, and
recognize, than IP addresses. Domains which are intended only for use as link targets, such
as those used to spread deceptive sites, need not be short, memorable, or even recognizable
since most users do not know how to interpret URLs [45]. Longer domain names are often
part of an attacker’s threat model because they obfuscate the true identity of the site. We
examined the average length of hostnames from our sample of CT log data and the Tranco
8

Available at https://tranco-list.eu/list/N73W.
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top million (both of which we presume to be mostly benign), together with those on the
public blacklist. The average hostname length in the CT log and blacklist were both 20,
but the average hostname length in the Tranco list was only 15. For contrast, the average
length of sites on the blacklist containing a recognizable site name such as PayPal, Google,
or Apple was 31. When choosing a length boundary, consider that many hosts in CT logs
are not accessed via web browsers but most sites in blacklists and the Tranco list are. By
constraining the length of domain names to something reasonably comprehensible, attackers
will be forced into a smaller space of possibilities when choosing deceptive domain names if
they want to avoid a risky assessment.

Behavior-based Rules
Excessive redirects The URL changed 2 or more times before settling [29, 33]. Although
HTTP headers are the primary mode of redirecting, other kinds of redirects should be
considered, such as those from <meta> tags or JavaScript, which are executed within a certain
duration of the source being downloaded and evaluated. This rule triggers for sites that
maliciously use redirects to inject tracking, misdirect users, or stuff the history. Redirects
from HTTP to HTTPS without a change of hostname or path don’t need to be counted.

First visit by link This is the first time the user has visited this site, which was accessed
by clicking a link. As this is almost always the case when unknowingly accessing a deceptive
site, this rule can be highly effective in warning users before they engage with a new site
for their first time, effectively adding a TOFU security model to web browsing, much like
what SSH relies on. Because this rule does not depend on the hostname like several other
rules, it is immune to clever or non-obvious, deceptive domain names that might not trigger
the other rules. However, public computers or browsers without much browsing history may
yield lots of positives from this rule. It may be advisable to only engage this rule after a
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regular browsing history has accumulated. To further reduce appearing too often, this rule
might be restricted to riskier interactions such as data entry or downloading files.
Hostname language mismatch One or more characters contained in the domain name
are not common in the page’s language (according to either the HTTP Content-Language
response header or user’s language preferences in their browser, which are sent in the
Accept-Language header). Operating under the assumption that IDNs should be used to
match a site’s or visitor’s native language, this rule attempts to warn when sites use IDNs
inappropriately, like when using Unicode characters to achieve visual similarity to a targeted
domain name [17].
As a further consideration, rules might optionally be constrained in more ways than
are described here. In practice, some rules might be more helpful only in conjunction with
certain interactions or presence of the site’s hostname in the browser history. For example,
the rule “First visit by link” need not trigger unless the user starts to enter information into
the page, to help reduce warning fatigue [2], as opposed to being predicated solely upon the
site which is being visited.

3.4

Evaluation

We ran an IRB-approved survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk among highly-rated workers
to assess the perceived usefulness and likely responses of participants to example warnings
generated and explained by some of these rules. We showed participants a sample warning
text and asked three questions:
1. Would you want to be notified when you are (unknowingly) in a situation described by
this warning?
2. Would you find warnings like this helpful to you while using the Internet?
3. Which of the following would you be most likely to do in response to this warning?
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i. Connection is not private

vi. Site name is unusually long

This page was loaded insecurely, making it risky to rely on what
it says or does. Information you enter on this page may not
stay private, and the content of this page could be malicious or
links on this page could take you to malicious sites. Further,
other people or systems may know that you are visiting this
specific page, along with the full contents of the page.

This site has a lot of parts to its domain name, which can be
confusing and may be an attempt to mislead visitors. Ensure
that you intend to be on
installupgradenow.fastandgoodcontentjust
4youtodownloadthisweek.stream.
vii. First visit to this site

ii. Connection is not fully private
Some of this page was loaded insecurely, making it risky to rely
on what it says or does. Information you enter on this page
may not stay private, and some content of this page could be
malicious or links on this page could take you to malicious sites.
iii. Site address is suspicious
The address of this page (paypal.com.secure-log.in) is
similar to another site you have visited before (paypal.com).
If this page looks similar to paypal.com, it may be trying to
deceive you.
iv. Excessive changing of sites
This page changed to different sites multiple times when you
visited it, suggesting that the link you clicked may possibly be
malicious.

This is the first time you’ve visited this site, and you reached it
by following a link that is difficult to trust.
If this site looks like a site you’ve visited before on this
computer, this one might be trying to deceive you. Be careful
about entering information into this page.
Because this is your first time on this site, this warning will not
appear next time.
viii. Reading this site may be risky
You have never read content on this site before. Make sure you
intend to be on ny-times.com and not nytimes.com which
you have visited in the past.
If this site looks like nytimes.com to you, then the site you’re
currently viewing might be trying to deceive you.
ix. Site name does not match its language

The other pages visited were:

The content of this page is in English, but its address contains
non-English characters. Although not always the case,
sometimes malicious sites use non-English characters to appear
like well-known sites in attempts to deceive visitors. Be aware
if this site asks for anything suspicious or sensitive.

(a) http://foo-bar.ad-services.com/track?id=asdf1234
(b) http://download-mania.com/download/foo123
(c) https://login-paypal.com/webscr.cgi?partner=foobar

x. Site name has excessive hyphens
v. Site address may be a typo
You have never visited this site (gooogle.com) before, but you
have visited one with a very similar name (google.com). It’s
possible a mistake was made typing the address, and as a
result, you could be on the wrong site.

This site has a lot of hyphens in its domain name, which is
unusual for sites that collect information. Be aware that you
are on a site belonging to webeatech.com, which may or may
not be what you intended.

You should double-check that you intend to be on
gooogle.com.

Figure 3.1: Examples of warnings generated by some of rules which we trialed in our survey.
Each participant was shown one randomly-sampled warning text (Figure 3.1), and
each warning text was sampled approximately 40 times. Our choice of 40 is grounded in
both research and precedent; Virzi found that 90% of usability issues are uncovered with
10 subjects [48], and previous studies of a similar nature used 50-70 subjects [42]. The full
survey is shown in Appendix A.1.
We elected to ask the participant about the warning text associated with a rule rather
than about the rule directly, because the rules require some specific technical knowledge to
understand, while the warnings are designed for anyone to be able to read; and we assume
that the rules will be carefully chosen by experts in the field so that average users will not
need to understand them. We did not explicitly explain that the warnings could be wrong,
i.e. false positives, because users will not be told this when using their web browser; instead
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Want
to be
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How helpful is the warning

Most likely reaction

Rule

Yes

Very
unhelpful
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Helpful

Very
helpful

InvestigateLeave
further

Leave
and
return

Be
skeptical

Avoid
entering
info

Ignore
warning

Plaintext HTTP
Partial HTTPS
Similar URL
Excessive redirects
Typosquatting
Long domain name
First visit
Reading site
Language mismatch
Excessive hyphens

91.1%
95.1%
97.7%
94.1%
87.8%
77.1%
83.9%
88.9%
86.0%
86.0%

4.4%
0%
0%
0%
6.1%
2.9%
3.2%
5.6%
0%
4.7%

0%
4.9%
0%
0%
0%
8.6%
6.5%
2.8%
6.25%
7.0%

37.8%
63.4%
39.5%
44.1%
49.0%
45.7%
48.4%
44.4%
25.0%
60.5%

46.7%
29.3%
55.8%
47.1%
34.7%
25.7%
32.3%
38.9%
43.75%
16.3%

16.7%
26.8%
37.2%
17.6%
34.7%
20.0%
35.5%
27.8%
23.3%
41.9%

7.1%
2.4%
0%
5.9%
6.1%
8.6%
6.5%
5.6%
2.3%
2.3%

9.5%
2.4%
9.3%
5.9%
6.1%
11.4%
0%
11.1%
23.3%
9.3%

19.0%
39.0%
9.3%
11.8%
8.2%
5.7%
19.4%
0%
14.0%
14.0%

2.4%
0%
0%
0%
2.0%
8.6%
12.9%
11.1%
7.0%
11.6%

11.1%
2.4%
4.7%
8.8%
10.2%
17.1%
9.7%
8.3%
25.0%
11.6%

45.2%
29.3%
44.2%
58.8%
42.9%
45.7%
25.8%
44.4%
30.2%
20.9%

Table 3.1: Results from the survey about warnings pertaining to various rules.
of suggesting the absolute presence of a threat, the warnings are carefully phrased to inform
users to allow them to make their own judgment.
We hypothesized (1) that participants would prefer to be notified when they are
in situations typical of deceptive sites, (2) that they would find the warning text helpful
in making a decision, and (3) that their reactions to the warning would be reasonable in
magnitude given the described risk.
Results are shown in Table 3.1. Across all warnings, 89% responded (to Question 1)
that they would want to be notified when they were unknowingly in the situation described
by the warning text. Although certain warnings were less popular than others, the vast
majority of participants would like to be informed if one of these rules triggered. Although
we aren’t sure from this survey alone why the results were so positive, we have two theories:
users might like to be informed and make their own decision (some results from our later
user study back this up), or participants did not consider that warnings might appear even
when they are not actually at any risk. We discuss the difficulty of false positives later in
this paper.
The least popular warning was associated with the “Long domain name” rule, to
which 22.9% responded that they would not want to be notified in that situation. Upon
reviewing this, we realized a slight error in this warning text, which was written for the
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“Many labels in domain name” rule, but the domain name chosen for the warning was simply
a long domain without many labels.
Some of the warning texts contained domain names that were pulled from actual risky
scenarios, such as phishing names for popular sites. These names could easily look suspicious,
especially to a trained eye. To help ascertain whether the results were skewed toward our
hypothesis by our choice of domain names, we re-ran the survey on those warning texts with
a single set of changes: we replaced the suspicious-looking domain names with values that
are legitimate so that experts at least would conclude that there is no actual risk (i.e. false
positives). For example, the warning based on the “Excessive hyphens” rule was changed to
use the domain of a real German pizza shop. We found that there is no statistically significant
difference between the results of the two surveys. From this, we think our initial results were
not biased toward positive answers due to the names being suspicious.
Across all warnings, 83% of participants responded that warnings like these would be
either Helpful or Very Helpful to them (Question 2).
We also asked participants what they would most likely do in response to seeing the
warnings (Question 3). The results suggest that participants think they are able to at least
somewhat assess their situation and make reasonable decisions accordingly. For example,
45% participants who were shown a warning for “Plaintext HTTP” would leave the site and
not come back, while only 19% said they would simply avoid entering information into the
site. Conversely, 29% of participants who were shown a warning for “Invalid, weak, or partial
HTTPS” said they would leave the site and not come back, while 39% said they would avoid
entering information into the site. This seems reasonable since, in practical terms, the former
depicts a more risky situation than the latter, and entering data into a site can generally be
considered more risky than simply visiting a page.
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Chapter 4
Risk Indicator

Our second contribution is a browser indicator (comprised of an icon, label, and
togglable text) that is designed for warnings (or “tips”) which grab attention, educate users,
maintain parity on both desktop and mobile screens, and is hard for malicious sites to mimic
with high fidelity. It differs from current browser indicators primarily in its objective: rather
than informing about connection security or trying to prevent the user from continuing, the
goal of the risk indicator is to bring something unusual to the user’s attention, entice them
to click to get more information, and to help them decide for themselves if they are at risk.
Unlike current connection security indicators which are often incorrectly associated
with a site’s safety [38], our risk indicators build on these preconceived notions by providing
information about the user’s interaction with the site. In addition, the risk indicator shows
no positive affirmations, uses more informative (and less opinionated) description text, and
provides a UI capable of replacing full-page interstitials, including the ability to show the
warning text automatically when a serious or blocking issue needs attention.
The risk indicator can share an implementation on mobile and desktop browsers due
to its low screen space requirements. We believe it also holds promise as an alternative
to full-page interstitial warnings (Figure 2.3) which can be easily mimicked by malicious
sites, because the risk indicator and its warning text do not appear solely in or over the
content area of the browser. Upon clicking a risk indicator, the warning text appears in
a container element separate from the page which overlaps at least slightly with the URL
bar (Figure 1.2)—current versions of Firefox and Chrome already do likewise with security

30

ID
!ST
iST
!R
?R
!PR
?PR
!C
?C
!A
iA

Design
! SAFETY TIP
i SAFETY TIP

! RISK
? RISK

! POTENTIAL RISK
? POTENTIAL RISK

!
?

CAUTION
CAUTION

! ADVICE
i ADVICE

Table 4.1: Different icon and label designs we trialed for the indicator.
indicators (Figure 2.1). For warnings so severe that user actions need to be blocked before
continuing, browsers can still implement this blocking behavior and automatically pop-out
the warning text without using the content area of the page.

4.1

Methodology

Like current indicator designs, the risk indicator icon and label appears to the left of the URL.
The icon and label only appears when the risk framework yields a “Risky” assessment. It does
not show a padlock, EV certificate subject name, or any other positive reinforcement; trust
decisions are left up to the user. The objective, then, is to effectively convey the information
so that the user can make an informed decision about how risky their interaction is.
In designing a new indicator, we started with previous research and current browser
indicator designs, then explored ways to communicate risk rather than security. In keeping
with prior work [11], we chose red as the color but varied the icon and label in a Mechanical
Turk survey to inform the best combination (Figure 4.2) for an eventual user study.
We started with

i

,

!

, and

?

icons. Variations on the label included SAFETY TIP,

RISK, POTENTIAL RISK, CAUTION, and ADVICE. We surveyed 10 combinations (Table 4.1), some of which are not so different from Firefox’s newest indicator design (Figure
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Figure 4.1: One of the example risk indicator designs we surveyed.
2.5) [51]. Our objective was to find the combination which got the users attention so that
they would want to click the indicator, but which did not overly alarm them.
Figure 4.1 shows an example screenshot of a risk indicator we trialed in our survey;
the full list of actual images is in Appendix A.2. We chose to show the risk indicator in place
next to a sample domain name, to ensure that participants would understand the context in
which this would appear. The domain name was carefully selected to be one that is fairly
well-known and trusted among the majority of the demographic. This way, we can be more
certain that responses which indicate alarm or suspicion are more likely due to the indicator
and not the domain name.

4.2

Evaluation

We prepared a brief, IRB-approved, between-subjects survey that we ran on Amazon Mechanical Turk about the various risk indicator designs (Table 4.1). Each indicator style was
sampled about 40 times. We showed an image of the risk indicator and explained that it was
at the top part of a web browser. We then asked four questions:
1. What do you think the indicator (pointed to) means?
2. Suppose you visited a website and this indicator appeared. How safe you would feel
about the current website?
3. Which of the following would you be most likely to do after seeing the indicator?
4. What do you think the source of the indicator is?
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Figure 4.2: The icon and label we felt was the best choice among the designs we tested.
Our objective was to inform the design of the user study by finding the indicator that
yielded the most desirable results. Ideally, the presence of a risk indicator would (1) make
users feel less safe (although we anticipated that some participants might feel more safe if
they believed the browser was protecting them, but the results don’t suggest this); (2) would
elicit a moderate response—preferably clicking the indicator to get more information, but not
leave the site and never come back or ignore the indicator entirely; and (3) would be most
recognized as originating from the browser and not the website, a virus, or other sources.
Overall, the indicators caused 84% of respondents to feel Unsafe or Very Unsafe, while
12.5% felt no different about the site with a risk indicator. A few answered that they felt
more safe with some indicators, but this was only 3%.
When asked what the respondent would do upon seeing their indicator, the results
varied (Figure 4.3). Across all indicator designs, the top choice was “Leave the site and not
come back,” an answer we deem fairly extreme, at 49%. The preferred answer we would
have liked to see is “Click it / get more information” because that will help the user make
informed decisions before deciding to permanently leave a site. Two indicator designs, both
using the “Safety Tip” wording, resulted in more than 50% of respondents who would have
clicked to get more information, and we consider these to be our top contenders.
From these results, we don’t claim that people will actually take these actions for
certain indicators; we simply wish to show that there are differences in how users perceive
them and in what they think they would do.
As for the source of the indicators, 59% correctly thought that the source of the
indicator was the web browser, followed by 20.25% thinking the website, and 16.25% thinking
a virus or malware, even after being told to look at the top part of a web browser. It is
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Ignore it and continue using the site normally
Avoid entering information into the site
Be skeptical of what I read or see on the site
Leave the site then come back to it
Leave the site and not come back
Click it / get more information

Figure 4.3: “Which of the following would you be most likely to do after seeing the indicator?”
unclear whether the respondents chose Website or Virus/Malware because they thought
that something about the website or a virus triggered the browser to show the warning,
thus causing it to be the “source” of the indicator, as if the browser was detecting that and
protecting them.
Ultimately, the choice of indicator we used for the user study was subjective, as there
were two or three candidates that could have worked well. We settled on

! SAFETY TIP

because

it elicited responses in the most desirable range: respondents suggested that they would feel
somewhat unsafe after seeing it, would be most likely to click it, and were correct about the
source of the indicator being the web browser. It also has a positive sentiment and is the
least ambiguously-worded, while drawing attention to the urgency of one’s safety, as opposed
to simply an informational message.
The indicator with the fewest “Leave the site and not come back” answers was
i SAFETY TIP,

but it also had one of the highest “No different” answers to Question 2. We think

either of these indicator designs could be good choices.
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Chapter 5
User Study

We conducted an IRB-approved, within-subjects user study in which we invited 50
participants into our lab to use a simple web browser we made which exposed them to
three treatments: (C) current browser security indicators, (R) our new risk indicator which
pops-out the warning text when you click it, and (RA) our risk indicator that automatically
pops-out the warning text; and then asked them to fill out a survey with which we collected
both quantitative and qualitative data. Our objective was to understand if users were able
to make better trust decisions with the risk indicator, and whether users felt that warnings
like this were helpful toward making them aware of risky situations.
The demographics for our study consisted of university students recruited through
advertisements across campus. The participants followed a near-normal distribution when
self-reporting their skills and understanding of computers and technology.

5.1

Methodology

We built a simple, single-tab web browser that embedded a Chromium webview below a
familiar-looking URL bar area which consisted of back and forward buttons, a stop/refresh
button, and a rich text box for the URL which we modeled after Google Chrome 70. We did
our best to preserve common Chrome functions with basic fidelity, including searching from
the address bar. The browser logged relevant, high-level user activities such as clicking an
indicator, dismissing its warning text, entering data into a form on a page (sans the actual
data), navigating to a page, and switching treatments.
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Before beginning, participants were told that the purpose of the study was to evaluate
new kinds of browser warnings, and we showed them a picture of where indications of potential
risks would appear. We instructed participants to approach each task as if they were on
their own computer, but because prior work has shown that role playing biases participants’
security behavior to be less secure [42], we also instructed them to use their real account and
payment information to complete tasks. They were told that they could skip any steps if
they felt uncomfortable.
Each participant repeated the task list three times, receiving a different treatment
on each iteration, with the three possible treatment sequences being ordered round-robin.
Due to effects of conditioning, we decided to only examine the effectiveness of each treatment
from participants who received that treatment first; but we wanted them to experience the
other two treatments so they could answer questions comparing them in the survey.
Treatment C was the current browser security indicator design, which shows a padlock
on HTTPS pages and displays the scheme portion of the URL, even for https://. Treatment
R was our risk indicator, which appears only in the presence of potential risks and which
hides the URL scheme for https:// but displays it for others. Treatment RA was also our
risk indicator, but with an automatic pop-out of the warning details (as if the user had
clicked it right away). Risk indicators and warning pop-outs used an easing function over .3
seconds which resulted in a subtle “pop” effect (the UI element was scaled from 0% to 110%
for the first half of the animation, then reduced to 100% at the animation’s end)—we felt
this natural motion grabbed attention without being too distracting.
Participants were given four tasks, two of which simulated risky scenarios. The first
task was benign: log into their university account and check their class schedule. The second
task was risky: search for university news, click a search result that led to a press release
about a change to a controversial university policy, and read the article. Although this article
looked identical to a legitimate news page, it was fabricated for the study and was written to
be convincing. The third task was benign: go through checkout on a popular e-commerce
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site, entering and saving their actual credit card information, but stop short of completing
a real purchase. The fourth task was risky: log in on either a popular payment processing
website, a popular email service provider, or begin creating an account on a personal finance
reporting website. The full instructions gave participants the specific sites to visit and how
to access them.
To simulate risks on the deceptive tasks, the URLs displayed in the address bar were
manipulated. On Task 2, participants were shown a locally-sourced HTML page that looked
like the real thing, and were informed after the study that the article was fabricated. On
Task 4, participants were on the real site even though the URL looked phishy. We built in
fail-safes to prevent accidental form submission on any task that could have side effects such
as completing a purchase or creating an account. Due to these design measures, participants
were never exposed to real risks.
Our hypotheses were that (1) users complete fewer risky interactions in the presence of
risk indicators than with the current browser indicators; (2) in the presence of a risk indicator,
users understand that their actions may be risky; (3) after clicking a risk indicator, users
understand the specific risk they are taking; and (4) when users complete risky interactions,
it is based on understanding the risk and deciding to proceed anyway.

5.2

Results

We obtained two sets of data from the user study: an exit survey which contained both
qualitative and quantitative questions, and an activity log which we analyzed to measure
behaviors. All open-ended responses were jointly coded by multiple researchers in our lab
using a conventional content analysis approach [18]. Our primary takeaways from this study
are:
• Subjects generally think the risk indicator warnings are more helpful than unhelpful.
• The majority of subjects preferred Treatment RA.
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• The presence of risk indicators can be correlated with fewer risky interactions.
• Subjects have varied recollections of past experiences with browser warnings, but the
vast majority remember dealing with them previously.
• Subjects report more confidence in assessing their own risk with the help of risk
indicators than without it.
• The most requested improvements to risk indicators are: (1) a way to get more
information, (2) more assertive, clearer warning texts, and (3) the ability to customize
warning behavior.

Helpfulness. When told to consider that warnings could be wrong sometimes, 76% of
participants responded that risk indicators are generally Helpful or Very Helpful. 10% said
they were No Different, and 14% thought they were Unhelpful. We found that the helpfulness
of warnings may depend on the risk being indicated. About Task 2, 70% responded that
the warnings were at least Helpful, and for Task 4, 76%. 20% mentioned that they did not
agree that they would be at risk in real life when the risk indicator appeared. Although some
said this was because their email account held nothing sensitive, etc., warning texts could
probably be written to be more convincing.

Preferred treatment. There was a clear favorite of the three treatments. 58% of the
participants preferred treatment RA because of its brief explanation of the situation, and they
“actually noticed it.” 28% preferred R because it was “still noticeable” but “not annoying.”
The remaining 14% preferred current security indicators mainly for two reasons: they liked
the positive affirmation of safety, and they were used to looking for the lock icon. Interestingly,
multiple participants mentioned an “unlocked” icon, even though no major browser uses one.

Mitigating risk. We measured when participants entered data into the “deceptive” page
on Task 4 and found a statistically significant result based on the first treatment they received.
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Treatment

Preferred by

Representative Quotes

C

14%

“Having the lock constantly there helped me feel more
secure.”
“I’m used to it, and I already check for it.”

R

28%

“It feels more descriptive than the current security
indicator, so I can be better informed while I browse.”
“It warns me of potential errors or problems with the
URL without being disruptive.”

RA

58%

“It catches your attention and explains why the site
is risky.”
“If I’m busy multitasking or not paying close attention, there are times I may have missed the risk
indicator with no pop-out.”
“...the automatic pop-out caught my attention and
made me pay more close attention to the risk.”

Table 5.1: Treatments reported as most preferred by participants, along with quotes representative of each class.
Treatment C = 100% data entry. Treatment R = 75%, and Treatment RA = 71% (p = 0.032
Fisher’s exact, V = 0.345). We then followed their behavior through the next two treatments.
For treatment cycle C-R-RA, data entry rate was 100-89-65%. For R-RA-C, 75-69-81%. For
RA-C-R, 71-62-62%.

Past experiences. 90% of participants wrote about their past experiences with browser
warnings. Some people chose to heed warnings specifically because they didn’t trust how they
got there, or the task was frivolous enough that they lost interest. When ignoring or bypassing
warnings, the vast majority of respondents said they did so because they trusted the site they
were on, assumed they were on their intended site, or weren’t entering information anyway.
Some described basing their decisions on how serious the warning read or on how sensitive
or important their task was (e.g. logging into a junk email account is not a high-stakes
activity). Not only does this back prior research [38], it backs the notion adopted by our
approach which is that warnings should help users make their own trust decisions based on
their current situation, rather than attempting to block tasks entirely.
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Figure 5.1: Histogram depicting individuals’ shift of confidence from judging their risk
without risk indicators, to doing so with risk indicators (on a scale of 1-5). A positive change
represents an increase in confidence with risk indicators.
Confidence. Participants were asked how much they agreed that they would be confident
in assessing their own risk, first without risk indicators, and second by investigating a warning
from risk indicators. On a scale of 1-5 (Disagree-Agree), the average agreement for the former
was 2.4 and, for the latter, 3.2. Figure 5.1 is a histogram of the individual differences on
this scale, exhibiting a statistically-significant trend (p < 0.001 Fishers exact, V = 0.481) to
being more confident with risk indicators.

Improvements. By far, the single-most requested feature (30%) is to offer advice on how
to investigate the potential risks, like a “Learn more” link. Some participants even mentioned
wanting this when recalling their past experiences with browser warnings, adding that current
“Learn more” articles are too generalized. Overall, participants seemed eager to learn at a level
they could understand, and we agree with Reeder et al. that “there may be an opportunity
for SSL warnings and browsers more broadly to better educate users about the security
properties of SSL” [38] (and about deceptive sites generally). Other common requests were
to clarify or strengthen the warning text and to make warnings customizable.
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Chapter 6
Discussion

We think there are several interesting points of discussion for this approach and
inferences to draw from the results.

6.1

False Positives

Risk indicators probably will appear on benign sites, but they are also likely to reveal threats
that current browser indicators miss because risk indicators support more scenarios that are
not considered by browsers. Multiple respondents in the user study even said they would
prefer false positives over false negatives: “I’d rather have a false positive than have something
slip through the cracks.” and “These threats were serious and I didn’t want to miss them
accidentally.” Others, of course, remarked that false positives would be annoying, saying, “It
would drive me nuts. I’d honestly use a different browser.”
In designing our work, we found it difficult to concretely define false positives and false
negatives, and we realized that mapping risky interactions to actual threats is an imprecise
science. Even current browser warnings have this difficulty [38]. For example, in most
browsers, an expired TLS certificate blocks page load and invokes an interstitial warning.
Unless the client’s clock is wrong, this is almost never a “false positive” in the technical sense,
because the current time is, in fact, outside the certificate’s NotAfter timestamp. Although
this is definitely a security error, it is in practice unlikely that an attacker is using an expired
certificate to conduct surveillance or manipulate traffic.
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It may be obvious that a security certificate expired, but why is it expired? Is the
site having technical difficulties? Maybe the operators forgot to renew it, or perhaps the CA
refused to issue a new certificate due to validation trouble. It is hard to know for certain.
In this way, current browser warnings are not so different from risk indicators. A risk
indicator may appear because a domain name has a lot of labels. But why does it have so
many labels: is it a development server? A vanity subdomain? Or a deceptive site trying to
hide its true identity? There are both benign and malicious possibilities.
Without more infrastructure, it seems difficult to know for sure how a technical
characteristic relates to real threats, and so the warning takes on more of an advisory role in
conveying when an interaction happens in a context where there is good reason to have less
trust in the site. Hence, our approach uses a less opinionated design.

6.2

Unopinionated Design

Our warning style encourages users to learn more and conduct their own investigation. From
an economic perspective, manually inspecting all the factors considered by our framework on
every site is untenable and would lead to more lost time than simply becoming a victim and
remedying the fallout [16]. However, the risk assessment framework automates the majority
of this labor and invites user intervention only when necessary.
Carefully-worded, educational warnings and the context used by the risk assessment
framework are crucial for more effective protections. As warning fatigue has decreased,
“improving adherence rates may require addressing numerous smaller, more contextual issues.
For example, users seem to consider decision factors like importance of their primary task
and whether alternative sites with similar content are available; warnings could perhaps tip
some decisions toward adherence by nudging users away from trivial tasks or pointing them
toward alternative sites” [38]. In accordance with that, the rules used by this framework and
the warnings produced from them may be able to help convince users when they are at risk,
or at least advise them to adjust their current trust level.
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Wording is one aspect of opinionated design, but choices offered to the user are another.
A recent study by Mozilla Firefox UX researchers recommends “employing opinionated design,
to an appropriate degree” [51]. They “encouraged users to make the safer choice by giving it
a design advantage as the ‘clear default choice’” [9, 51]. We think there is a way to balance
unopinionated wording with opinionated options.

6.3

Identity Mapping

One of the most common requests from the user study was to improve warning messages by
being more specific about whether the site was really the site they thought they were on. For
example, respondents wanted messages like, “This is not one of Google’s authorized URLs”
when logging into a fake Gmail page. We like this idea because most users cannot interpret
URLs effectively, and there is even contemporary work experimenting with removing them
from the UI entirely [45].
However, creating and maintaining an accurate, authoritative mapping between legal
entities and DNS properties is not trivial. This is similar to what Extended and Organizational
Validation (EV/OV) certificates try to do, but their utility has been questioned in recent
years [19]. This is an area for future research.

6.4

Customizability

Several participants requested the ability to customize warning behavior. This comprised
two specific themes: making the automatic pop-out adjustable (some wanted this based on
site or severity), and the option to configure site settings before allowing a risky interaction.
We think both would be useful. The first could be vital for reducing warning fatigue or
annoyance. The latter gives users more options than just leave or continue, which are the
only two options presented even by most of today’s browser warnings. Respondents would
like the ability to “toggle settings for that website before you continue with it,” which implies
blocking the risky interaction, notifying the user, and allowing them to customize what the
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site is allowed to do (set cookies, download files, use a lot of CPU or memory, etc.) before
proceeding.

6.5

Preconceived Trust

We noticed that several participants wrote about their experience with either the current
security indicator or the new risk indicator as if they had already made a trust decision before
consulting the indicator. This is concerning for two reasons.
1. Users might only consult security indicators if they notice something unusual about
the page themselves first. As one respondent said, “If I notice something suspicious on the
website, I can check the security indicator to see if it’s really the site I was intending to visit.”
However, not all deceptive sites are visibly altered, so the user is unlikely to notice anything
suspicious. Another said, “When it warned me about sites that I visit frequently, I stopped
paying attention to it,” even though in our study the risk indicator never appeared on a site
they have visited at all, let alone frequently. This tendency prevailed with other participants
who wrote, “I wouldn’t want to have to deal with [the risk indicator] every time I log into a
website that looks similar to one I’ve used before,” and “I thought that the site looked just
like Gmail, so I kept using it,” apparently assuming that malicious sites cannot look like
legitimate ones.
2. When users don’t notice anything wrong on a deceptive page, they will instinctively
trust how they accessed the site, and subsequently trust further interactions, despite warnings
from the risk indicator. This is exhibited by responses like, “If I knew that I was on a safe
site, then I could continue on that site without having to [dismiss the warning] a bunch of
times,” and “I usually assume I know better than the alert system.”
Multiple participants across a breadth of technical skills shared this kind of thinking,
rendering indicators of both kinds less useful to them since their mind was already made up.
Our data confirm Reeder et al.’s recent findings, that “many respondents cited their trust in
a site as a reason to proceed despite an SSL warning” [38].
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6.6

Developer Considerations

It would be helpful for website developers to gain insights into how their sites are viewed by
the risk assessment framework. Most browsers have a developer tools section, and we think
an area dedicated to the assessment of technical properties of the site, as well as information
related to the history of the display of the risk indicator on that site, could be used to
help developers improve their sites. A reporting URI, like that which is implemented for
Content-Security-Policy, could be specified by site owners so that clients can report when
the risk indicator is shown on their site. Since attackers could also specify a reporting URI,
browsers would need to be careful not to send any data in a report that is could reveal
sensitive patterns such as the user’s browsing habits. Even if attackers abuse this feature to
successfully tune their misbehavior to avoid risky assessments, it forces them into tighter and
tighter technical constraints within which to operate. If done correctly, these tools would
make it easier for developers to improve their sites, cut down on false positives, and help
more sites to adhere to best practices.

6.7

Browser Adoption

There are thousands of research publications dedicated to detecting phishing and many other
kinds of deception on the Web, and we were only able to reference a small sample of them
in this paper. The vast majority of them are quantifiably successful, in that they report
results significantly better than the baseline. One question we asked ourselves as we sifted
through the many contributions was, “With so much successful work, who is bringing these
protections to the users of the Internet?”
We are keenly aware that many of the published methods are available in some form:
source code, browser extensions, antivirus and security software, packaged as part of a larger
distribution, or integrated behind-the-scenes into existing services. But it seems that few—if
any—mainstream web browsers have adopted one or more of the published methods. Web
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browsers have made progressive advancements in their protections over the years, but with
so many methods in published literature, why does it appear that so few get used?
If future work in this area is to be realized, we think this is worth some consideration.
Although we do not have the answer, we suggest several theories.
• Mainstream browsers tend to be conservative in deploying new features and protections
so as to avoid disrupting massive user bases, along with all the side-effects which come
from that (including financial, technical, and legal aberrations).
• Patents might make some technologies unavailable by browser vendors.
• There are real logistical issues when shipping client-side software. Threats evolve
quickly, and techniques proposed a few years ago might be obsolete already. Most major
browsers ship stable-channel updates every few weeks or months. Attackers ship new
sites every few minutes. This could put browsers at a disadvantage if their client-side
protections are updated on the same release cycle.
• Bandwidth and privacy constraints prevent a browser from calling out to remote servers
on every page load. (This is already implemented in some cases to enforce OCSP, but it
puts heavy load on OCSP responders and is easily blocked.1 ) Thus, a feasible solution
should be able to operate entirely client-side.
• Browser vendors may also have their sights set higher than just squeezing out more
precision and recall from detection algorithms; instead of being very conservative, they
may be very progressive by spending time implementing other new technologies. As one
Firefox developer recently articulated, “Web Authentication (WebAuthn) is our best
technical response to phishing, which is why we’ve championed it as a technology.”2 .
1

“High-reliability OCSP stapling and why it matters.” Cloudflare. https://blog.cloudflare.com/
high-reliability-ocsp-stapling/
2
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.platform/q5cj38hGTEA
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We hope that browser vendors will be more motivated to further our research and
adopt this work because our method is easy to tune, generalizes better across a wider variety
of old and emerging threats (because we do not attempt to classify individual threats), and
really gets at the crux of what we think warnings should be about: helping the user to make
informed trust decisions.3

6.8

Limitations

Studies have shown that what people say they will do and what they will actually do in
practice is different [36, 37]. This is called self-reporting response bias, but the bias is often
systematic [36]. It can be difficult to draw conclusions from minor variations in our surveys
because we only made minor textual and graphical changes. Since the purpose of our survey
on risk indicator design (Appendix A.2) was mainly to inform our eventual user study, this
bias was tolerable in our case.
The demographic of our user study was limited to local university students, so our
results might not generalize to wider populations. However, many participants indicated they
were not particularly tech-savvy, which is one trait that is likely more representative of a
general population.
The study was also performed in a lab setting on our computer with a custom web
browser, and with clear instructions to look for the indicators, but to approach the tasks as
if they were on their own computer. We acknowledge that this is subject to the Hawthorne
effect, and hope that future work in partnership with mainstream web browsers (especially a
longitudinal study) will help provide greater insights into risk indicators.
A longitudinal study would also help answer questions about the effectiveness of this
approach in the field because there is no universal ground truth we can use to evaluate risk
assessment as described by our method. Because risk is assessed on a per-user, per-interaction
3

We suggest that if browser warnings really were about blocking or disabling threats absolutely, there would
not be ways to bypass or override them. Because bypassing warnings is possible and sometimes appropriate,
then it follows that warnings must actually be about helping users make their own trust decisions.
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basis, any definitive list of risky interactions would have to generate hypothetical scenarios
and browser histories, then augment those with interactions, and experts would need to apply
manual judgment to classify each data point. We began working on this but altered our
evaluation to use surveys and a user study because not only was producing a generated data
set tedious, but we determined that it has little transferable real-world value.
Although we think our user study was well-designed in that it asked participants to use
their real credentials and payment information when completing the tasks, many participants
noted that they continued to complete tasks because they knew they were in a lab study and
they believed we wouldn’t expose them to any actual threats. Despite our request that they
approach these tasks as if on their own computer, this sense of security may have slanted
their behavior in the study to be more cavalier.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion

We introduced the idea of a risk indicator which is worth exploring as an alternative to
security indicators. The risk assessment framework we outlined describes a way to carefully
craft rules to control the appearance of the risk indicator and the associated warning text.
Our user study evaluated the effectiveness of the risk indicator in a controlled environment
and collected feedback about this approach to security. Our results show that when indicators
are designed to use context beyond the security of the connection, they can help protect users
in a Web that is fully transitioned to HTTPS.
Our work revealed several areas where additional work is needed:
• Assessing risks: Our work posits there is a gap between the threats that can be detected
with near 100% certainty by current anti-phishing tools and purely benign pages. This
gap includes sites that are more broadly deceptive than phishing and malware attacks,
as well as phishing or malware attacks that have not yet been identified by existing
tools or those which do not target a global audience (such as spear-phishing). More
work can be done to better characterize this space of potential threats and to measure
the use of deceptive techniques broadly.
• Assessing risk communication: Our work can be placed in a broader set of works on risk
communication as related to computer security. More work is needed to study how well
the warnings we developed communicate risk to end users and whether the warnings
help users make choices (either acting on or ignoring the risk) that align with their
understanding and context. This could best be accomplished with studies of the risk
49

indicator in real-world scenarios, over longer periods of time, and with a more diverse
population.
• Risk indicator design: Our work represents an initial design of the risk indicator. Our
results narrowed down the choice for an icon and accompanying label to just a few
among the choices we studied. Work could be done studying additional designs with
larger samples. In particular, using an informational icon such as

i

may be more

in keeping with current practices for browser indicator design. Likewise, there are a
variety of practical questions to answer, such as handling the case when multiple rules
are triggered for the same interaction.
• Improving utility for users: Users would like to see a variety if improvements in
assessing threats. For example, they would like to see a better mapping from URLs to
website ownership, customizable warning behavior, and a clear set of instructions for
investigating their risk further. More work could be done in these areas in addition to
identifying further areas for improvement.
Our contribution explored the approach of indicating risk and paved a foundation for
more research. We think further work in this direction and continued cooperation within the
Internet security and web browser communities will lead to more aware and informed users,
and fewer successful deception attacks on the Web.
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Appendix A
Mechanical Turk Survey
A.1

Task #1

Suppose you were using your web browser normally and were shown this warning: (sample
from one of the following)
i. Connection is not private
This page was loaded insecurely, making it risky to rely on what it says or does. Information you enter on this page may not stay private, and the content of this page could
be malicious or links on this page could take you to malicious sites. Further, other
people or systems may know that you are visiting this specific page, along with the full
contents of the page.

ii. Connection is not fully private
Some of this page was loaded insecurely, making it risky to rely on what it says or does.
Information you enter on this page may not stay private, and some content of this page
could be malicious or links on this page could take you to malicious sites.

iii. Site address is suspicious
The address of this page (paypal.com.secure-log.in) is similar to another site you
have visited before (paypal.com). If this page looks similar to paypal.com, it may
be trying to deceive you.

iv. Excessive changing of sites
This page changed to different sites multiple times when you visited it, suggesting that
the link you clicked may possibly be malicious.
The other pages visited were:
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(a) http://foo-bar.ad-services.com/track?id=asdf1234
(b) http://download-mania.com/download/foo123
(c) https://login-paypal.com/webscr.cgi?partner=foobar

v. Site address may be a typo
You have never visited this site (gooogle.com) before, but you have visited one with a
very similar name (google.com). It’s possible a mistake was made typing the address,
and as a result, you could be on the wrong site.
You should double-check that you intend to be on gooogle.com.
vi. Site name is unusually long
This site has a lot of parts to its domain name, which can be confusing and may be an
attempt to mislead visitors. Ensure that you intend to be on
installupgradenow.fastandgoodcontentjust 4youtodownloadthisweek.stream.
vii. First visit to this site
This is the first time you’ve visited this site, and you reached it by following a link that
is difficult to trust.
If this site looks like a site you’ve visited before on this computer, this one might be
trying to deceive you. Be careful about entering information into this page.
Because this is your first time on this site, this warning will not appear next time.
viii. Reading this site may be risky
You have never read content on this site before. Make sure you intend to be on
ny-times.com and not nytimes.com which you have visited in the past.
If this site looks like nytimes.com to you, then the site you’re currently viewing might
be trying to deceive you.
ix. Site name does not match its language
The content of this page is in English, but its address contains non-English characters.
Although not always the case, sometimes malicious sites use non-English characters to
appear like well-known sites in attempts to deceive visitors. Be aware if this site asks
for anything suspicious or sensitive.
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x. Site name has excessive hyphens
This site has a lot of hyphens in its domain name, which is unusual for sites that collect
information. Be aware that you are on a site belonging to webeatech.com, which
may or may not be what you intended.

1. Would you want to be notified when you are (unknowingly) in a situation described by
this warning?
• Yes
• No
2. Would you find warnings like this helpful to you while using the Internet? (Very
Unhelpful—Very Helpful)
3. Which of the following would you be most likely to do in response to this warning?
(a) Investigate further
(b) Leave the site and not come back
(c) Leave the site then come back to it
(d) Avoid entering information into the site
(e) Ignore the warning and continue using the site normally
A.2

Task #2

Look at this image of the top part of a web browser: (sample from one of the following)
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1. What do you think the indicator (pointed to) means?
2. Suppose you visited a website and this indicator appeared. How safe would you feel
about the current website? (Very Unsafe—Very Safe)
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3. Which of the following would you be most likely to do after seeing the indicator?
(a) Click it / get more information
(b) Leave the site and not come back
(c) Leave the site then come back to it
(d) Avoid entering information into the site
(e) Ignore it and continue using the site normally
4. What do you think the source of the indicator is?
(a) The website
(b) The web browser
(c) An ad
(d) Virus or malware
(e) A hacker
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Appendix B
User Study Questionnaire
1. On a scale of 1 to 5, how would you rate your skills and understanding of computers
and technology?
1/Simple = No formal technical training; 3/Intermediate = Specific technical training for
certain tasks; 5/Advanced = Received education in a tech/computer-related field or had years
of industry experience

2. In this study, you experienced three ways for web browsers to warn you of potential
threats. One of the ways is what browsers currently show, called a ”security indicator”
which signifies a secure connection to the site:

Another way was our new ”risk indicator” design, which signifies a potential threat:

Another way was our new risk indicator which automatically pops out the details of
the warning:
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Which of these 3 ways do you prefer the most?
• Current browsers’ security indicator
• Risk indicator
• Risk indicator with automatic pop-out
3. Why do you prefer that one the most?
4. If you completed any tasks even when you saw one of the new risk indicators that we
have designed, it was mostly because:
• I knew I was in a lab study so it must have been safe
• I thought that’s what I was supposed to do to finish the study
• I did not agree that I would be at risk in real life
• I did not see the risk indicator
• I did not understand the risk
• (I did not complete any task where I saw the risk indicator)
• Other:
5. If you encountered our new risk indicator warnings in your daily web browsing like
those you experienced today, how helpful do you think they would be? (Consider that
these warnings could appear with interactions that are not risky, because computers
may not be perfect.) (Unhelpful—Helpful)
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6. When you saw our new risk indicator, did you understand that it signified potential
risks that need investigating?
• Yes
• No
• I did not see any risk indicators
7. Have you ever encountered a browser security warning when visiting a web page before
today’s study?
• Yes
• No
• Not sure
8. If yes, could you describe what happened, and whether you sought more information
about how to respond to the warning?
9. One variation of the new risk indicators you experienced involved the warning text
dropping over part of the page automatically when a potential risk was detected. How
would you describe your reaction when that happened? (check all that apply)
• I was surprised
• I was startled
• I read the warning text
• I dismissed it without reading it
• I ignored it
• I was annoyed
• I felt protected
• I felt more vulnerable
• I didn’t notice any drop-down warnings
• Other:
10. What did you think was the source of the new risk indicators/warnings?
• The website
• The web browser
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• A hacker
• A virus or malware
• An advertisement
• Other:
11. Task #2 asked you to read a BYU News article. The news site you visited was actually
not genuine and the article was fake. A risk indicator appeared in an attempt to warn
you of this. The questions in this section are about this warning:

If you encountered this warning in real life, how helpful would you find it? (Unhelpful—
Helpful)
Which of the following would you be most likely to do in response to this warning?
(check all that apply)
• Investigate further
• Leave the site and not come back
• Leave the site and then come back to it
• Avoid entering information into the site
• Ignore the warning and continue using the site normally
12. Task #4 asked you to log in to PayPal, Google/Gmail, or create an account at Mint.
A risk indicator appeared because the link you clicked was manipulated to take you to
a deceptive site that could have tried to steal your information. The questions in this
section are about this warning:
65

(Repeat the previous two questions)
13. Current safety indicators in browsers tell you the page is safe when it is encrypted:

A site that is not encrypted currently looks like this:

In the future, every site will be encrypted, even deceptive or malicious ones. We’re trying
to find new browser indicators that will warn people of potential threats regardless of
encryption. No system can be perfect, however, so some safe sites may have a warning
of risk, and some sites that are not safe might not have a warning.
What are we doing right, in your opinion?
What are we doing wrong, in your opinion?
14. Please describe situations when you would you be most likely to ignore the warning
and not click on it:
Examples: shopping, banking, social media, reading the news, leaving comments, etc.

15. Please describe situations when you would you be most likely to heed the warning by
clicking on it and getting more information:
(same examples)

66

16. “I am confident that I would be able to judge whether I am at risk without the new
risk indicators.” (Strongly Disagree—Strongly Agree)
17. “I am confident that if I chose to investigate a potential risk from the new risk indicator,
I would be able to judge whether I am at risk.” (Strongly Disagree—Strongly Agree)
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Appendix C
Study Coordinator Guide
1. Before the participants arrive:
(a) Unlock the study computer.
(b) If the custom web browser is not already open, open it. Otherwise, click Lab
Study and then choose New Subject.
(c) Place the participant instructions next to the keyboard.
2. Make sure the participants are qualified.
(a) 18 or older
(b) Have not previously participated in a user study about web browsers
(c) Have not been informed as to the details of this study by someone who has taken
it
3. When the participants arrive, read them the following:
Welcome to our study. I am a study coordinator, and am here to assist you as
needed.
4. Have participant sign the consent form.
Please read the consent form we are giving you. The main points of this form are
that:
(a) We are going to ask you to use a web browser on our computer to perform
specific tasks that are common when using the Internet.
(b) Please approach the tasks as if you were at your own computer, because you
will be using your own account and payment information. Since the purpose
of the study is not for you to complete all the tasks, you are allowed to skip any
of the steps that you do not feel comfortable completing.
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(c) At the end of the study, you’ll be given a survey to fill out. Your answers may
be published, but with no identifying information.
(d) You will receive $15 as compensation for your participation in this study. The
expected time commitment is approximately 45 minutes.
(e) If you request it, we will delete all data collected from your participation.
5. Take the participant with whom you will work to the study room. Ask the participant
to sit down, and say:
Please read through the instructions before you begin, and ask me if you have any
questions about them. Otherwise, you can then start on the tasks.
6. When the participant is done, load the exit survey on the computer. Direct the
participant to begin the survey.
7. When they finish, debrief the participant:
We had you perform various tasks that could have normally posed some risk to you
or your personal information. In this study, our custom web browser simulated
these risks and showed you warnings when it determined you could have been at
risk if this had happened during normal use of the Internet.
However, you were never actually at any real risk. Furthermore, the BYU News
article you were asked to read is not real. It was fabricated for the purpose of this
study.
In reality, web browsers don’t show warnings for a number of risks that exist on
today’s Web. Our research purpose today is to improve browser warnings by exposing potential threats that users are not currently warned about. We hope that
because of your participation, we can help make a safer Web a reality.
Are there any questions or concerns that I can address for you?
8. Thank the participants for their time.
9. Help them fill out the compensation forms and take them upstairs to receive compensation. If it is at a time when the office is closed, direct them where to go at a later time
to receive their compensation.
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Appendix D
User Study Participant Guide
The computer in front of you is running a very simple web browser, similar to Google
Chrome or Mozilla Firefox. You can use the Internet with it much like you’re used to doing
on your own computer, except there are no tabs.
We would like you to carry out some normal Internet-related activities using our web
browser. There are 4 specific tasks we have described below for you to do. We’d ask you to
follow the steps as listed, even if you know another way to do the task. However, the purpose
is not that you finish every task; you do not need to complete all the steps to a task if you
feel uncomfortable.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate new kinds of browser warnings to help users
understand threats against them or their information while using the Internet. At times, you
may notice indications of potential threats at the top-left of the browser by the site address
(URL), in this area:

You will repeat the task list 3 times. Each time, a different variation of the indicator
will be used when risks are detected. You may skip any task if you feel uncomfortable finishing
it.
Please use our web browser for all tasks (i.e. don’t use your own device) and do not
exit the browser. However, you may reference your own phone or computer if you need to
look up information (such as your password), in order to complete a task.
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If you have any questions about the instructions, you may ask the study coordinator
for assistance.
D.1

Task #1

a. Go to google.com.
b. Do a search for byu homepage.
c. Click on the first result for BYU’s website.
d. Log in to myBYU.
e. Check on your class schedule, if you have classes.
f. Log out of myBYU.

D.2

Task #2

a. Go to google.com again.
b. Search for byu news.
c. Click on the first result, which should currently be a story about BYU honor code
policy.
d. Read the article.

D.3

Task #3

a. Navigate to ebay.com.
b. Find a product that looks interesting to you and click Buy Now.
c. Begin going through checkout as a guest using your credit card. Fill out the
forms completely as if you were going to buy the item. Enter your address and continue,
then enter your credit card information and click Done, but do not actually complete
the purchase (do not click “Confirm and pay”).
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D.4

Task #4

For this task, complete only the first set of instructions that applies to you.
D.4.1

If you have a PayPal account:

a. Go to google.com.
b. Do a search for paypal login.
c. Click the first result.
d. Log into your PayPal account and check the Recent Activity.
e. Log out of PayPal.
D.4.2

OR, if you have a Google/Gmail account:

a. Go to google.com.
b. Click the blue Sign In button.
c. Log into your Google account.
d. Check your Gmail.
e. Log out of your Google account.
D.4.3

OR, if you have neither:

a. Go to google.com.
b. Search for mint banking.
c. Click the first result.
d. Click the orange Sign Up Free button.
e. Fill out the form, but do not submit it.
D.5

Repeat these tasks

At the top of the browser, click “Lab Study” and then click “Next Treatment” — then repeat
the tasks.
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D.6

Repeat these tasks again

At the top of the browser, click “Lab Study” and then click “Next Treatment” — then repeat
the tasks.
By the end of the study, you should have worked through tasks 1-4 three times.
D.7

Completing the Study

Tell the study coordinator you are done. You will be asked to fill out a short survey about
your experience and then you will receive your compensation. Thank you for participating
today!
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